Economy of Minds: Emerging Multi-Agent Intelligence with Economic Interactions
AuthorsZhenting Qi, Huangyuan Su, Ao Qu, Chenyu Wang, Yu Yao, Han Zheng, Kushal Chattopadhyay, Guowei Xu, Zihan Wang, Weirui Ye, Vijay Janapa Reddi, Ju Li, Paul Pu Liang, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Sham Kakade, Yilun Du
Resources
This paper argues that you can build smarter multi-agent systems not by centrally coordinating them, but by creating an economy where agents bid, earn, compete, and evolve into better reasoners.
Key results
Llama-3.1-8B partial agents before training
Llama-3.1-8B after EOM training
Performance after 30 training tasks
EOM on GEMMINI with Gemma-4-31B-it
Best total data-transfer cost achieved by EOM
What the paper found
Economy of Minds, developed by researchers affiliated with Harvard, MIT, 2077AI, and the Kempner Institute, proposes a decentralized multi-agent framework in which LLM-based agents compete through auctions, exchange payments via a bucket-brigade rule, and evolve through wealth-based selection rather than centralized orchestration. Each agent is only a local wake-up predicate and policy, with bids frozen at introduction and wealth updated by downstream rewards, so credit assignment emerges from market dynamics instead of explicit global supervision. Across five agentic tasks, the system turns weak partial specialists into stronger collective systems: on MATH, Llama-3.1-8B improves from 15.9% to 57.0% and Gemma-2-9B from 4.2% to 45.1%; on Finance-Agent-Bench it rises from 45.0% to 60.0% after 30 training tasks; on FrontierScience-Research it reaches 20.0% best-run accuracy; on GEMMINI accelerator design it cuts average EDP to 39.3 versus 80.2 for DOSA; and on Cloudcast it achieves a best cost of 657 versus 930 for OpenEvolve. Ablations show the gains depend on the full economic loop: removing exploration drops Finance-Agent-Bench mean accuracy to 26.0%, while removing auctions reduces it to 48.0%. The theoretical analysis links bids to expected payoff, shows outcome-only reward can suffice once the market selects near-optimal specialists, and characterizes bucket-brigade payments as Bellman-like and Shapley-like credit signals.
Original abstract
How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.
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