SCOPE: Compiling Natural-Language Policies into Neurosymbolic Predicate Programs
AuthorsArnon Mazza, Elad Levi
AffiliationsPlurai
SCOPE turns natural-language rules into interpretable programs that can enforce policies on LLM agents more reliably and cheaply.
Key results
SCOPE test accuracy on Coaching.
SCOPE test accuracy on Escalation.
SCOPE test accuracy on Plan.
SCOPE test mean-Jaccard score on Tile-match.
Maximum times cheaper per 1,000 samples than direct Gemini-3.1-Pro inference.
At most this share of Tile-match samples changed predictions across repeated runs for transferred decompositions.
What the paper found
SCOPE turns a natural-language policy into an executable Python program combining narrow neural predicates, deterministic extractors, and explicit composition logic. Claude Opus 4.8 helps build and revise the program; at inference, smaller executors answer its predicates. The key innovation is optimizing the program and its training data together: local adversaries probe predicate errors, systemic adversaries target gaps in the overall logic, and a strong teacher labels the counterexamples. Across Coaching, Escalation, Plan, and Tile-match, SCOPE led or tied in 10 of 12 task-executor settings. With OpenAI’s GPT-5.4-nano, it scored 0.85 on Coaching, 0.82 on Escalation, 0.87 on Plan, and 0.78 on Tile-match, measured by mean Jaccard. Programs built with that executor also transferred without further optimization to models including DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash and Qwen3, reaching frontier-model-comparable results; inference cost was up to 47 times lower than using Google’s Gemini-3.1-Pro directly. On repeated Tile-match evaluations, at most 7% of samples changed predictions for the transferred decompositions, versus 37% for OpenAI’s GPT-5.5 and 26% for Gemini-3.1-Pro. The explicit predicate traces make verdicts inspectable, while adversarial counterexamples help keep the compiled program aligned with the policy rather than merely fitting a fixed sample set.
Original abstract
Policy enforcement for LLM agents has shifted from single-turn content moderation to compound, application-specific policies evaluated over multi-turn transcripts and tool-call trajectories. Fine-tuned guardrail models are efficient but degrade on compound policies, and while LLM-as-a-judge approaches achieve higher accuracy, they incur high inference cost and tend to produce unstable predictions. Neurosymbolic methods offer a natural alternative, decomposing the policy into narrow neural decisions composed under explicit logic. However, existing symbolic layers lack the required expressiveness and are optimized against fixed data rather than the policy itself. To address this, we introduce SCOPE, which compiles a policy into an executable program of neural predicates executed by small models, deterministic extractors, and code that composes their outputs. The program is optimized jointly with its training data, using adversarial generation of counterexamples that target where the program deviates from the policy. We evaluate SCOPE on a benchmark of real-world policy tasks against prompt optimization, task decomposition, and workflow generation methods, achieving the highest average accuracy across tasks and models. Programs optimized with the weakest executor transfer to other models without further optimization. This allows them to be deployed in production on inexpensive models, where they reach accuracy comparable to frontier reasoning models. Unlike these monolithic models, SCOPE produces substantially more stable predictions, and each verdict is interpretable through the predicate outputs that produced it. Additionally, we validate the key components of our method through an ablation study. SCOPE thus enables reliable, interpretable, and efficient policy enforcement at production scale.
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