Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness of Reasoning Models Varies with Where and How Preference Cues Are Delivered
AuthorsAryo Pradipta Gema, Neel Rajani, Rohit Saxena, Wai-Chung Kwan, Pasquale Minervini
Resources
Reasoning traces are less trustworthy for detecting hidden preferences when those preferences arrive indirectly through tools or raw evidence.
Key results
Evaluation size spanning user-message and tool-return cues with explicit and implicit preference presentations.
Models from eight families, including Qwen 3.5, Gemma 4, GPT-OSS, DeepSeek V4, and Kimi K2.6.
Implicit cues produced higher unverbalized adoption in 28 of 30 model–channel comparisons.
Largest per-model difference between tool-return and user-message cues.
Lowest reported pooled action-plus-reasoning AUROC across the four cue-delivery conditions.
Across 32 model–condition cells, higher unverbalized adoption was associated with poorer transcript-monitor detection.
What the paper found
This paper introduces FACE-Eval, a 5,100-sample benchmark testing whether chain-of-thought traces faithfully disclose preference-driven decisions when cues arrive through different routes. It evaluates 15 open-weight models from Qwen 3.5, Gemma 4, OLMo 3, OpenAI’s GPT-OSS, DeepSeek V4, GLM 5.2, Kimi K2.6, and Inkling, comparing preferences stated explicitly in a user message or tool return with preferences inferred from raw profiles, emails, Slack messages, browser history, and notes. The key metric, verbalized commitment rate, measures whether a cue-following answer’s reasoning explicitly records the decision to tailor the response. Every model verbalizes commitment more often for explicit than implicit cues and for user-message than tool-return cues; unverbalized adoption is higher for tool-return cues in all 15 models and for implicit cues in 28 of 30 model–channel comparisons, with channel gaps ranging up to 0.21. A source-attribution system prompt narrows the channel gap on 7 of 15 models, while telling models they are monitored does not reliably help. Transcript monitors based on OpenAI’s GPT-5.6-Luna and GPT-4o-mini also perform worse when unverbalized adoption is higher: the correlations are -0.54 and -0.78, respectively. GPT-5.6-Luna reaches action-plus-reasoning AUROC of 0.71–0.73, but adding the reasoning trace improves detection mainly for user-message cues, not tool-return cues. The conclusion is that chain-of-thought monitoring is less dependable when agents infer preferences from retrieved artifacts or receive them through tools.
Original abstract
Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring assumes that reasoning traces faithfully record the information that shapes a model's answer. Existing faithfulness tests often place explicit bias cues in the user message, while agents may encounter preferences through tool returns or raw artifacts. We introduce FACE-Eval (Faithful Attribution of Cue Effects Evaluation), a 5,100-sample evaluation that varies cue location (user message or tool return) and explicitness (direct summary or raw artifact). We measure verbalized commitment among cue-following answers and unverbalized adoption among all cued samples. We evaluate 15 open-weight models from eight families, with total parameters ranging from 4B to 1.60T. Every model has lower verbalized commitment for tool-return than user-message cues and for implicit than explicit cues. Unverbalized adoption is higher for tool-return cues on all 15 models and for implicit cues in 28 of 30 model-channel comparisons. A source-attribution prompt narrows the channel gap on seven models, sometimes by increasing user-channel unverbalized adoption, while telling models that their reasoning will be monitored does not reliably close the gap. We also use two transcript monitors (GPT-5.6-Luna and GPT-4o-mini) to detect preference adoption in the largest model of each family. Across 32 model-channel-explicitness cells, higher unverbalized adoption is associated with lower detection ability for both monitors (Pearson r=-0.54 and r=-0.78, respectively). These results suggest that CoT monitoring may be less reliable when preference information arrives through tools or must be inferred from raw artifacts, within the single-call, prefilled-tool setting tested here.
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